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COYOTES AND SHEEP 
Some Thoughts on Ecology, Economics and Ethics 
FREDERIC H. WAGNER 
FORTY.FOURTH HONOR LECTURE 
Winter 1972 
Faculty Association 
Utah State University 
Logan, Utah 
FORTy-FOURTH ANNUAL HONOR LECTURE 
DELIVERED AT THE UNIVERSITY 
A basic objective of the Faculty Association of Utah State 
University, in the words of its constitution, is: 
to encourage intellectual growth and development of its mem-
bers by sponsoring and arranging for the publication of two 
annual faculty research lectures in the fields of (1) the bio-
logical and exact sciences, including engineering, called the 
Annual Faculty Honor Lecture in the Natural Sciences; and 
(2) the humanities and social sciences, including education 
and business administration, called the Annual Faculty Honor 
Lecture in the Humanities. 
The administration of the University is sympathetic with 
these aims and shares, through the Scholarly Publications Com-
mittee, the costs of publishing and distributing these lectures. 
Lecturers are chosen by a standing committee of the Faculty 
Association. Among the factors considered by the committee in 
choosing lecturers are, in the words of the constitution: 
(1) creative activity in the field of the proposed lecture; (2) 
publication of research through recognized channels in the 
field of the proposed lecture; (3) outstanding teaching over 
an extended period of years; (4) personal influence in de-
veloping the character of the students. 
Frederic H. Wagner was selected by the committee to deliver 
the Annual Faculty Honor Lecture in the Natural Sciences. On 
behalf of the members of the Association we are happy to present 
Professor Wagner's paper: 
Coyotes and Sheep: Some Thoughts on Ecology, 
Economics and Ethics 
Committee on Faculty Honor Lecture 
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INTRODUCTION 
To many persons not in the profession, the term wildlife 
management largely connotes the husbandry of fish, birds, or 
mammals for hunting and fishing purposes. Even if we grant an 
implied breadth in his use of the term "recreation," Leopold's 
(1933:3) definition of game management in his classic book by the 
same name tends to foster this impression: " ... the art of making 
land produce sustained annual crops of wild game for recreational 
use." 
Today's wildlife manager assumes a broader scope to his 
field. That scope includes the management of wild animal popula-
tions and their environments for a number of values in addition 
to the recreational. Preservation of rare and endangered species, 
and of representative, undisturbed areas of the earth's ecosystems 
fall within his area of responsibility as does the husbandry of fish 
and game resources purely for food and other products (d. Das-
mann, 1964). Control of wild animals deemed to be nuisances for 
one reason or another also falls within this area. 
/ 
- Control of animals which prey on livestock or other wildlife 
is, of course, part of this latter responsibility. Most wildlifers 
"( would agree that predator control is potentially a part of any wild-
/ life management program, and The Wildlife Society in its position 
statement on animal control ". . . recognized that control of 
animals to minimize damage caused by animal populations is an 
essential element in a sound program of wildlife management." 
(Anon., n.d.) . Indeed, intensive predator control has long been 
an integral part of wildlife management in Europe. 
However, the position of many American wildlife managers 
on predator control is an ambivalent one. For while it is adopted 
in principle, as in The Society's statement, it is seldom put into 
general practice as a measure for increasing wildlife populations 
for recreational use. The reasons are several. First, there is still 
a great deal of uncertainty about just how influential predators 
are in affecting the population levels of game species. Second, even 
if effective, a general predator control program over an area the 
size of a state would be extremely expensive. Third, most Ameri-
can wildlifers have a strong ecological background which pre-
disposes them to value the full diversity of the natural world, and 
to be hesitant over very extreme single-value alteration of the biota 
for game. 
This ambivalence is by no means shared by all groups of the 
American society. One area in which, until recent years, predator 
control has been carried out without self-doubt is in the support 
of agriculture for the protection of domestic animals. In most 
value systems, the production of food and income is ranked above 
the esthetic and recreallimal. And the same singleness of purpose 
which has plowed under major parts of continents has not ques-
tioned the extreme reduction, if not elimination, of predatory ani-
mals. Reinforced by the deep-seated prejudice against predators 
/ 
pervading Occidental culture (Allen, 1954) and probably most 
others, the food-producing incentive prompted the organization 
of a large, federal predator-control organization during World War 
I. 
The organization grew during the 1920's and 30's, coming to 
be known in the latter decade as the Division of Predator and 
Rodent Control in the De artment of Interior's Fish and Wildlife 
Service . Reorganized in the 1960's, it is now called the Division 
of Wildlife Services in Interior's Bureau of Sport Fisheries and 
Wildlife. Today the Division employs a staff of over 600 personnel, 
and operates on a budget of some $8 million. Over three-fourths 
of this budget is spent on predator contror'in roughly that part 
of the United States west of the 100th meridian, and about 60 
percent of the cost is paid by the livestock industry. 
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Despite its unwanted-stepchild aura to so many American 
wildlife managers, the size of the federal program, plus the re-
sources and effort pumped into state and local bounties and other 
control measures, make predator control one of the largest, single 
wildlife management activities in the United States. Yet, predator 
control receives scant attention in wildlife management textbooks, 
perhaps because so many persons in the profession are not aware 
of its extent, perhaps because of the sensitivities surrounding the 
subject. 
Perhaps in part for these same reasons, predator control has 
not generally received the research attention needed to give a clear 
picture (1) of the degree to which different predatory species, and 
combinations thereof, influence wildlife populations, and (2) of 
the costs, ecological side effects, and game-population responses to 
predator control (Wagner et aI., 1967). In all fairness, one must 
say that such studies would be complex and quite costly. Many 
research administrators doubtless question the wisdom of com-
mitting major funds to such studies which, even if they demon-
strated favorable game responses, might well point to management 
programs that would be too costly, socially unpalatable, and eco-
logically undesirable. Nevertheless, the result is a continued in-
adequacy in our understanding of the role predation plays in the 
ecosystem. 
If we can rationalize to a degree the reasons why we have 
not had more research on predator control as a game-management 
tool, it is more difficult to rationalize the lack of research into 
predator control to reduce livestock losses. Here we have an estab-
lished program costing several millions of dollars a year. Even if 
the federal government did not recognize a responsibility to evalu-
ate it, one would think that the self-interest of the livestock in-
dustry would pressure for an examination of what benefit it was 
realizing from its outlay. 
The industry has obviously accepted on faith the assumption 
that the benefits equaled the cost. But Durward L. Allen, former 
Chief of Wildlife Research for the Fish and Wildlife Service, has 
told me that he repeatedly requested funds during the 1950's for 
evaluation of federal predator control, and his requests never re-
ceived serious consideration, presumably because such research 
would arouse the concern of the Predator and Rodent Control 
Division. In more recent years, since the re-organized Division of 
Wildlife Services has been under the able and objective administra-
tion of Jack H. Berryman, research funds to evaluate the program 
have still been wholly inadequate. And the industry remains con-
vinced that it is getting value received from its expenditure. 
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It is a growing environmental awareness in the American 
public which is beginning to raise ecologieal, economic, and ethical 
questions about predator control. An increasingly mobile, out-
doors-minded populace is becoming aware of its nation's natural 
heritage, and is experiencing it and enjoying its diversity. Aware 
that by statute all wildlife in the United States belongs to the 
people, that public is beginning to assert that predators have posi-
tive as well as negative values and that any predator-management 
program must rightfully acknowledge and take into account these 
multiple values. 
Aware of this rising tide of public opinion, and himself com-
mitted to a plurality of values in our natural resources, Secretary 
of Interior Stewart L. Udall appointed a five-man committee in 
1963 to evaluate predator control. Subsequently termed "the 
Leopold Committee" after its chairman, A. Starker Leopold, the 
Committee was given a short period to carry out its survey, but no 
time or resources to conduct any in-depth research. The report 
(Leopold et aI., 1964), while basically holding that some predator 
control for the protection of the livestock industry was economic-
ally and ethically justified, recommended numerous changes in the 
administration and practice of federal predator control. It was 
out of the Committee's recommendations that the Division of 
Wildlife Services was formed, and a professional biologist, Jack 
H. Berryman, appointed as its chief. 
By the early 1970's, the public had become more, not less, 
restive about predator control. Although Berryman had made 
major strides in professionalizing and streamlining the work of his 
Division, and in general had carried out the recommendations of 
the Leopold Report, there was still a considerable amount of busi-
ness-as-usual in the operations of the Division. While the Leopold 
Report concluded that the predator-control efforts in many areas 
were in excess of the need, it still conceded the need for a sizeable 
agency employed to carry out widespread control activities in 
western United States. These activities were not now condoned by 
much of the public. In addition, militant conservation organiza-
tions were unearthing and publicizing cases of insubordinate vio-
lations of Berryman's operating procedures. These were often 
implied to be regular occurrences when in fact such cases were 
promptly followed by disciplinary action, and in general the opera-
tions of the division had been substantially tightened. 
In any event, in June, 1971, Chairman Russell E. Train of 
President Nixon's Council on Environmental Quality, and Secre-
tary of Interior, Rogers C. B. Morton appointed a seven-man Ad-
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visory Committee on Predator Control and charged it with exam-
ing the entire question within a four-month period. A. S. Leopold 
was asked to sit on this Committee, and Stanley A. Cain, former 
Assistant Secretary of Interior, was asked to serve as Chairman. 
The Committee, hereinafter called the "Cain Committee," 
was asked "to review and analyze the predator control, and asso-
ciated other animal control programs and policies of the United 
States, evaluating their direct and indirect effects including en-
vironmental impacts and alternatives to present practices." 
'- Since my students and I had been carrying out research on 
coyote ecology in northern Utah and southern Idaho for several 
years, I as a Cain Committee member was asked to address my 
attention to the questions of coyote control and sheep losses. These 
questions needed particular attention because the major raison 
d'etre of western predator control is the reduction _of sheep losses 
by reducing g>yote ntimber&. Coyotes are among !he mosl abun5i-
ant.1!!!d widespread of predators in western United S~te~. And 
/
most livestock predatory losses are incurred by the sheep industry, 
. largely from coyote predation. Cattle are generally too large 
\ 
to be preyed upon to any signficant degree, and other domestic 
animals are either of very limited distribution, or largely protected 
\ by enclosure near to farm and ranch houses. 
The Cain Committee operated under the same difficulty 
as the Leopold Committee: inadequate time and resources to 
mount any actual research program. However, it was possible to 
delve into existing information from a variety of sources, and use 
this as a basis for the recommendations made in the Committee's 
report (Cain et aI., 1972). 
This lecture summarizes some of the findings we were able 
to marshall on the questions of coyote control and sheep losses. 
Some of the material reported herein was included in the Cain 
Committee report, some was not. The views reported here are my 
own. For the most part, the members of the Cain Committee were 
in agreement on the recommendations made. But shades of differ-
ences will inevitably occur among seven individuals, and the shades 
I present here may in a few cases differ slightly in hue from the 
opinions reached by other members of the group. However, they 
agree in essence with most points made in the Cain Committee 
report. 
Four basic questions seemed to need answers in order to 
evaluate this aspect of predator control: 
1. What is the effectiveness of individual control techniques, 
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combinations of these, and how much do the existing con-
trols reduce coyote populations? 
2. What is the magnitude of sheep losses and how much do 
existing control measures reduce those losses? How might 
these losses differ with different patterns of control? A 
corollary question is the relationship between coyote 
population density and the magnitude of sheep losses? 
3. What are the ecological side effects of coyote control? 
4. What are the conflicting values - economic, ecological, 
ethical, and esthetic - which might be weighed in mak-
ing any decision on predator control. No decision will 
satisfy all of these values, but whichever is made should 
be in the interest of the long-range, maximum collective 
benefit for society and the environment which sustains 
that society. 
The evidence reported herein was marshalled to answer those 
questions. None is answered unequivocally, but the patterns 
that develop in the data suggest hypotheses which can serve as 
bases for interim action and point the way for sound research. 
SOURCES OF DATA 
NEEDED DATA 
In traditional scientific methodology, answers to questions like 
Nos. 1-3 posed above are obtained through experimentation. The 
factor whose influence we wish to understand would be manipu-
lated, and we would observe the effect of that manipulation on 
the entity or process which the factor supposedly affects. In this 
context, answers to question Nos. 1-3 would be obtained by 
setting up experimental areas in which we would use different 
I combinations and intensities of control measures and observe the 
effects on (1) coyote populations, and (3) non-target predatory 
\ 
species; and in which we (2) would manipulate coyote numbers 
and observe the effects on sheep-loss rates. 
Populations of coyotes and other predatory species are un-
doubtedly influenced by a number of variables besides artificial 
control, and ~heep are lost to a vari~ty of causes ~esides p~. 
In the physical sciences, extraneous variables such as these are 
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controlled in the laboratory to prevent any unwanted "noise" in 
the experimental results. In the field situation facing many ecolo-
gists, such extraneous variables usually cannot be controlled. Con-
sequently, each experiment must be replicated a number of times 
and carried out over a number of years in order to average out the 
effects of these variables, and permit the experimenter to separate 
their effects from those of the ones under examination. 
Coyotes and other predatory species are highly mobile, and 
undergo long-range, annual population dispersal. Experiments such 
as these would require very large areas - e.g., major portions of 
states - in order to avoid variation imposed by emigration and 
immigration. Knowlton's (1972) evidence suggested major influx 
into areas the size of counties in Texas. In addition to the need 
for large experimental areas, reliable methods for counting coyote 
and other animal numbers would be needed, as well as reliable 
methods for counting sheep losses. 
Even though experiments like these have not been purpose-
fully designed, they have been approximately and inadvertently 
set up. The federal predator-control operations in each state 
have varied over time, and their programs differ between states. 
But they have kept records of these programs as well as dat.a 
which can provisionally be used to indicate changes in the popu-
lations of coyotes and other carnivorous mammals. The Division 
of Wildlife Services, the U.S. Forest Service, and the Federal-
State Crop and Livestock Reporting Services have made estimates 
of sheep losses which can be compared with indicated changes in 
coyote populations. Each state for a period of years with a given 
coyote control regime, or with a given mean coyote density, be-
comes an experimental replicate and the several western states 
each for two or more time periods constitute a number of such 
replicates. 
DIVISION OF WILDLIFE SERVICES RECORDS 
Indices of Predator Populations. - Field agents of the Divi-
sion of Wildlife Services keep tallies of the number of coyotes 
known to have been destroyed by the various control techniques, 
and the annual totals for each state are kept on file in each, state 
office. These do not purport to be the total number of animals 
killed, as many of those destroyed by toxicants are never seen 
because they die at some distance and time after consuming the 
poison. But these totals can perhaps be viewed as the resultant 
of the state control group's effort, and if that can be standardized 
-i.e., if the kill can be placed on a coyotes-killed-per-man-year 
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basis - the success of the group can perhaps be expected to bear 
some relationship to the number of coyotes existing in a state 
and be usable as an index thereof. Since the division has also 
kept careful, annual records of the number of men employed each 
year, the data are available for calculating a standardized index. 
- There is some risk in such calculations in that the different 
~ control technique~ have not been used with equal intensity over the years, Thus,\ trapping was important in the 20's and 40y Coyote "getter~" (to be described below) were important in the 
. 1950's; and in the 1960's and 1970's there has been an increased 
effort in shooting from ground and air, and in finding and destroy-
ing spring-dens. _ But these are the techniques which take animals 
that are recorded. It is a basic premise of this study that these 
were used sequentially; and that each compensated for the others 
in its respective period of use. The result is something approaching 
constancy in those techniques which kill animals that are found. 
And the success of those techniques can consequently be used as 
indices of population abundance. 
One small test can be made of the validity of the coyotes-
killed-per-man-year indices. ( The values for Utah can be compared 
with the annual number of coyotes bountied in the state, the as-
sumption being that the annual number bountied also reflects 
the size of the coyote populatioiY. (The bountied animals are not 
the same as those taken by Division employees who are not per-
mitted to bounty the animals which they kill.) This comparison 
shows a close similarity in trend suggesting that we are looking 
at real indices of coyote population change in the state (Figure 1). 
Records of Control Activities. - In addition to maintaining 
annual records of the numbers of predatory animals taken, the 
division has kept records of the number of men employed annually 
(man-years of effort) for the past 30 to 40 years. It has also kept 
records in most states, but often for shorter time intervals, on the 
number of traps, poison baits, and other control measures used each 
year. These have been extremely useful in exploring the effects of 
some control measures on coyote populations. 
Records of Sheep Losses. - From the early 1940's to the 
time of his retirement in 1965, Owen Morris, former Utah director 
of the division, made a concerted effort to tally predatory losses 
in the state each year. At the end of each year, he personally 
contacted a leading sheep rancher in each county of Utah and 
asked him to contact the sheepmen in his county and obtain re-
ports of all sheep lost. These were then compiled and reported in 
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Comparison of Annual Coyotes-Killed-Per-Man-Year Indices from Division of 
Wildlife Services Records and Annual Number of Coyotes Bountied in Utah. 
Morris's annual reports. They were reported as totals and not 
converted to percentages, a fact that may allay suspicion that the 
trends in percentages shown later were colored to support his 
Division's efforts. For the purpose of this report, the annual loss 
totals have been divided by the yearly total number of sheep in the 
state estimated by the Federal Crop and Livestock Reporting 
Service, and converted to percentage killed by predators. 
In addition to these Utah records, division personnel in several 
western states have kept annual records of reported. sheep losses 
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which they have seen. These have not been the systematic efforts 
that Morris carried out in Utah, and hence they do not purport 
to be anywhere near complete tallies of the losses. They have also 
not been maintained continuously over the years. But, they can 
perhaps be used as indices of trends over the years if one can 
assume that a relatively constant force of men will receive more 
reports of losses in years with heavy depredations, and fewer re-
ports in years of light losses. 
The critical reader may question the use of these kinds of 
data, particularly in the preseJ'lt, hostile climate surrounding 
federal, predator-control operations. The suspicion will inevitably 
arise that division personnel mLy have shaded their records for 
one purpose or another, to reflect favorably on their operations. 
Conceivably, some trappers might have inflated their reported 
kill to curry favor with superiors or sheep ranchers. In more recent 
years, numbers of animals killed or amount of toxic agents, traps, 
etc., could be under-J ported to ease public criticism. 
It is possible that such biases have been introduced in some 
cases. But, my own impression upon looking at these records, and 
talking ",ith many of the personnel, is that they have been kept 
as consc_dntiously and accurately as possible. The trends over the 
years have been smooth and continuous, often following similar 
patterns in different states. They are the only data on predato; 
numbers we have, and one of the only three sets of long-term 
data we have on sheep losses. Without them, we are left only with 
the numerous subjective and episodic reports frequently cited in 
the 'contemporary media. It is a major hypothesis of this report 
that these data can be used with some reservation to shed light on 
the questions at hand. 
THE FEDERAL-STATE CROP AND LIVESTOCK REPORTING SERVICE 
ESTIMATES 
Sometimes termed the U.S. Department of Agriculture Statis-
tical, Reporting Service, this agency sends questionnaires each 
year to large samples of stockmen in each state. These question-
naires are the basis for estimating total numbers of sheep in each 
state annually, the lamb crops produced, and the number of sheep 
lost !o all causes. This valuable 50-year set of data has been ex-
tremely useful in analyzing total losses due to all causes over the 
years. 
These would appear to be some of the most reliable estimates 
available, for they only entail counting and no interpretations of 
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the causes of loss. They do not provide any estimate of predator 
losses, but they do place a ceiling on any such estimates in that the 
predator losses cannot exceed the total. Like Morris's and the 
Forest Service estimates (see below) these statistics have only 
been recorded as numbers of animals, no attempt having been 
made to convert them to percentages. 
During the years 1966-1969, the reporting services in the states 
of Montana, W"oming, Colorado, and Texas asked stockmen to 
report the numbers of sheep lost to predators. This information 
was requested in addition to the regular information on the ques-
tionnaires described above. These data were tabulated and sum-
marized by Reynolds and Gustad (1971) of the Division of Wild-
life Services. They provide one set of estimates of sheep predatory 
losses over a four-year period. 
J. S. FOREST SERVICE RECORDS 
Forest Service district rangers keep records of the numbers 
of livestock placed on the western National Forests at the begin-
ning of each grazing year, and the numbers removed at the end 
of the season. The difference between these two numbers consti-
tutes the total loss during the season due to all causes. The stock-
men involved are asked to assess the causes of loss, as nearly as 
possible, and hence predator losses during the period are estimated. 
These records are available over . several decades. 
The loss values are, of course, lower than the year-round 
estimates. The sheep have borne lambs prior to movement onto 
the Forests, and the lambing-ground losses have therefore been 
sustained prior to this season. Winter losses, which may be a 
substantial part of the annual total, are also not included in these 
grazing-season estimates. 
As in the case of the Division of Wildlife Services estimates, 
one needs to consider the possibility that these estimates are con-
sciously or unconsciously shaded to reflect favorably on some 
aspect of predator control. This seems quite improbable. Forest 
Service personnel have no vested interest in any particular control 
technique, or in control itself. Further, their data, like the divi-
sion's, are compilations of reports by individual stockmen over 
the state as a whole. The stockmen's reports are made to the 
numerous District Rangers who then transmit the information to 
the regional office for compilation. The compilations are of total 
numbers of sheep lost, and it is for the purpose of this report that 
total number of sheep lost has been divided by the total number 
of sheep grazed on the National Forests to derive annual percent-
ages or loss rates. 
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CHRONOLOGY AND METHODS OF COYOTE 
CONTROL 
Had experiments been designed to measure the effectiveness 
of different kinds and intensities of coyote control, various tech-
niques would have been employed at carefully controlled levels 
in replicated fashion, and population responses measured. In fact, 
the variation has come as predator control has changed in institu-
tional structure, and as new control techniques have been de-
veloped and replaced, to a degree, older methods. All of this has 
occupied a number of decades, in some cases predating any records 
which can be used for measurement. Some of the techniques have 
been used in combination. Overall, the data are too confounded, 
or wanting, to enable evaluation of any but a few aspects of the 
total problem. Yet, one or two generalizations can tentatively 
be drawn. 
Coyote control has taken place under private, state and 
federal sponsorship. Some western ranchers employ their own 
trappers to conduct control operations on their lands, or in some 
cases public land. Sport hunting and fur trapping also contribute 
to what must be considered private control operations. State de-
partments of agriculture and state bounties give impetus to control 
at the state lr vel. Except perhaps for bounty and some state 
records, no da ta exist on the nature and magnitude of this complex 
variety of efforts, and it is impossible to evaluate its influence. 
The federal effort, on the other hand, has been documented 
as described above. And since this has been the largest and 
most systematic control effort in most states, an evaluation of its 
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effects is tantamount to an evaluation of coyote control as largely 
practiced in most states. 
A number of recent publications (cf. Evanson, 1967; Mc-
Nulty, 1971; Olsen, 1971) as well as the Cain Report have reviewed 
the history of federal predator control, and that history need not 
be repeated here. Suffice it to say that, since its institutionaliza-
tion in the early part of this century, the effort has annually en-
tailed a full force of men in each of the western states up to the 
present. For example, in fiscal 1971, the equivalent of about 54 
men were employed in Wyoming, 48 in Colorado, and 30 in Utah. 
Although some recent critics have charged that the Division 
of Predator and Rodent Control and its successor the Division of 
Wildlife Services, has been an aggressively expanding organization 
owing to its own self-promoting activities, the Division's records 
do not bear out this contention, as the Cain Report clearly showed. 
There has been some state-to-state variation, but in general the 
number of men employed by the Division has declined steadily 
from around 1,500 men in the early 1940's to the approximate 
600 field men employed today (Cain et aI., 1972). It is true that 
the expenditures for the Division have risen steadily over this same 
period from about $2.7 million to about $8 million. But this in-
crease has largely gone into salary increases and increased oper-
ating costs that have characterized all sectors of the economy 
during the period. 
Four basic methods are used in coyote control, each with some 
variation in the manner or form in which it is used: (1) trapping, 
(2) "denning," (3) shooting, and (4) poisoning. Trapping, of 
course, involves the use of steel traps baited with various scents 
or the carcasses of dead animals. 
Denning is a spring operation in which coyote dens are located 
on foot, on horseback, or from the air during the breeding season. 
Once located, they are dug out and the pups destroyed. In recent 
years, carbon monoxide cartridges are ignited, tossed into the den 
which is then covered with dirt, and the pups asphyxiated. 
Shooting is a year-round technique. Coyotes are shot during 
chance encounters by field men, or they are lured within shooting 
range by different calling techniques. They are also shot from the 
air, especially in winter. 
Several toxicants have been used. One of the oldest is strych-
nine which is impregnated into small suet or tallow balls known 
as "drop baits." The "coyote-getter" is a small pipe imbedded in 
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the ground, and equipped with a trigger release which fires a pistol 
cartridge. The cartridge is loaded with cyanide crystals which 
are fired into the mouth of the coyote which trips the trigger. The 
animal is attracted to the device by a scent placed on it. The 
newer, spring-ejected "M-44" is less hazardous to humans and has 
substantially replaced the "getter." Two highly lethal toxic 
agents - sodium monofluoracetate, or "1080," and thallium -
are spread upon or impregnated into portions of a sheep or other 
animal carcass and placed for animals to feed upon during winter. 
The use chronology of these techniques has varied. Prior to 
the early 1940's the major techniques were trapping, shooting, den-
ning, and "drop baits." The coyote getter was developed in the 
early 1940's and was immediately put to widespread use. Thallium 
and 1080 appeared in the latter years of the decade. Thallium 
was soon abandoned in most states because of its high toxicity 
and nonselectivity. But 1080, which is more toxic to Canidae than 
other animals, has persisted to the present as a bread-and-butter 
control technique. 
In the view of professional control personnel, shooting and 
denning are the only techniques which are totally selective for 
coyotes. Traps, thallium, and strychnine are least selective, while 
coyote getters and 1080 are intermediate in selectivity. The latter 
gains its selectivity not only because of its canid selectivity; 
but also because 1080 baits are placed, one per township, to at-
tract the wide ranging coyote but avoid attracting a major portion 
of the other, less mobile animals in the landscape. And its use 
only in the winter protects hibernating and migrating species. 
These control methods are variously used for two basic strate-
gies. The first is general population reduction on the premise 
that sheep losses are some function of general coyote population 
density and if that density is reduced, sheep losses will be reduced. 
The second strategy is that' of apprehending specific, offending 
animals. A pair of coyotes may den near a lambing ground, and 
begin regular killing of lambs. If they can be apprehended, or 
the den destroyed, the depredations cease. 
Perhaps the only control method used almost exclusively for 
one of the strategies is 1080. Placed in township-square networks 
over major portions of a state, and out only in winter, this method 
is used almost entirely as a population depressant. 
Traps today are used primarily to apprehend offending ani-
mals. However, prior to the 1950's, huge numbers of traps were 
set over the landscape in what essentially was aimed at population 
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reduction. Shooting, too, is used for both purposes. Some workers 
comb large regions by air in winter for population reduction. But 
offending animals around lambing grounds are sometimes hunted 
and'destroyed from the air. Denning also serves the same dual use. 
Coyote getters and drop baits are used more as population 
depressants. But at times they may be concentrated early in the 
year in areas that will be used for lambing grounds in order to re-
duce later lamb kills in such areas. This type of concentrated, 
preventive use approaches the trouble-shooting strategy. 
In general, the trend over the years in the Division's efforts 
has been toward greater specificity for coyote control in the reo 
duction of trap and getter use, in the increased effort spent in 
denning and shooting, and in the heavy relifince on 1080. That 
reliance has simply come with the reduction of other techniques, 
and not through any increase in 1080 use. Contrary to the charges 
of recent critics, the level of 1080 use was relatively constant 
between the dates of its initial use in the 1940's and the mid to late 
1960's (Cain et aI., 1972). In the last few years, there has been 
an actual reduction in 1080 use. 
One exception to the increased specificity has been the 
periodic, heavy use of strychnine. In the three states of Utah, 
Colorado, and Wyoming, drop baits were heavily used in the 
1940's, were used to a much lesser extent in the 1950's, then once 
again gained attention in the 1960's (Cain et aI., 1972). 
FINDINGS 
EFFECTIVENESS OF CONTROL IN REDUCING 
COYOTE NUMBERS 
Response of Animal Populations to Exploitation. - The 
sincere, and well intentioned concern on both sides of the predator-
control controversy is producing a large number of assertions about 
the effects of control on coyote populations which are not based 
on adequate evidence or do not take into account the way in which 
animal populations function. Some stockmen and trappers assume 
that the removal of virtually any numbers of animals will reduce 
the populations and ameliorate livestock losses. On the other side 
of the question, some critics of control enumerate the numbers of 
animals taken by the Division of Wildlife Services annually, 
photograph dead coyotes hanging on fences, and conclude that 
the survival of the species is endangered in many, if not most, 
areas. 
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The basic problem on both sides of the question is two-fold. 
It is first a lack of any quantitative or statistical appraisal of the 
situation over the vast reaches of western United States. The 
evidence marshalled on both sides has been largely episodic and 
localized. And the problem, secondly, is a failure to take into 
account the population processes which characterize most animal 
species, and by which they absorb exploitive removal. 
To begin with, the coyote is a common and ubiquitous animal 
in western United States. By comparison, the number of control 
personnel is small over these large states. For example, the number 
of personnel in Utah in recent years has numbered around 34 per 
year. The area of the state is 82,000 square miles. By comparison 
with the number of control personnel, · the number of hunters in 
the state who kill small game and deer exceeds 100,000. 
It is impossible to determine precisely what the impact of 
control is upon the Utah coyote populations, but several figures 
are instructive. Clark (1972) estimated somewhere between 200 
and 500 coyotes annually on his 700-square-mile study area on the 
Utah-Idaho border in the late 1960's and 1970's. The population 
was at its lowest density among the years of the study in 1968, 
and increased each succeeding year. Hence, the higher value is 
perhaps realistic for 1970, but let us conservatively estimate 350 in 
that year, · or one coyote per two square miles. This may well be 
conservative as it is at the lower extreme of the commonly cited 
coyote densities for North America (Knowlton, 1972). One per 
square mile is not an unusual density. 
The Utah portion of the study area is in Box Elder County, 
a county of some 5,600 square miles. If the county-wide densi-
ties were similar to those of Clark's study area - and this seems 
reasonable on the basis of our knowledge of the area - the 
coyotes in Box Elder County may have numbered a conservative 
2,800 in 1970. In fiscal 1971, hunters presented 563 Box Elder 
County coyotes for the $6 bounty paid by the State. In the same 
year, Division of Wildlife Services personnel reported killing 180 
animals in the county. The total of the two figures is 743, or about 
one fourth of the estimated population size. 
It is quite probable that not all of the coyotes killed by non-
Division personnel were bountied. Arid Division kill estimates are 
conservative because a good proportion of the coyotes killed by 
1080 are never retrieved. Hence, 743 may underestimate the 
number killed by human activities. However, our population esti-
mate may also be conservative and hence the 25 percent value 
may remain as a reasonable estimate of the proportion killed. In 
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1968, the kill was lower with 155 bountied, 120 taken by Division 
personnel, and the combined values totaling 275. 
Over the state as a whole, the picture is similar. It would of 
course not be valid to assume a comparable mean density over the 
state similar to that in Curlew Valley, although 96 percent of the 
state area is uncultivated desert and mountain terrain as in the 
Valley. Yet, it seems entirely possible that there are a very few 
tens of thousands of coyotes in the 82,000-square-mile state. The 
combined bounty (4,400) and Division kill (3,388) total 7,828 
for 1971, and are probably a limited fraction of the statewide 
population. 
What might be the effect of an annual removal of perhaps 
25.-30 percent of the animals on the coyote population? The aver-
age coyote litter size is about six young in Utah, and under good 
food conditions and low densities, most of the first-year females 
may breed (Clark, 1972). The result is that the species is capable 
of nearly quadrupling its numbers each year through reproduction. 
This is a high rate of increase similar to that of many small birds 
and mammals. Clearly, the species must sustain a high annual 
mortality rate to prevent it from increasing indefinitely. F. W. 
Clark's data (unpublished) suggest a mean, annual mortality 
rate of somewhere near 60-65 percent per year in northern Utah. 
Knowlton's (1972) data suggest comparable rates, even in areas 
where no artificial control is carried on. 
Clearly, the species is constituted to absorb large losses and 
maintain itself through reproduction. ,Furthermore, nearly every 
animal species-and Knowlton's (1972) data suggest this for the 
coyote - possesses some degree of population resilience by virtue 
of density-dependent responses in reproductive and mortality 
patterns. As a species incurs heavy losses and suffers some popu-
l~tion reduction, other sources of mortality ease their impact, 
and/or reproductive rates increase, and the species strikes a new 
equilibrium with which it absorbs the new cause of mortality. 
This is not to say that a species cannot be overexploited and 
extirpated. But, it does not necessarily follow that, because large 
numbers of animals are killed, the species is endangered or its 
numbers materially reduced. It is density-dependent population 
responses such as those described which make it possible for man 
to remove a sustained yield over a long period of time through 
sport hunting and fishing, or commercial fishing. And it is in this 
way that a prey species in a primeval situation can withstand 
continued removal of individuals by a predatory species without 
its survival being seriously imperilled or numbers greatly altered. 
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The coyote is a ubiquitous species with a high reproductive 
rate, distributed over a vast region of North America. We cannot 
easily deduce the effects of control measures from the numbers 
of animals taken by control agents, or from the sight of a few 
dozen or few hundred dead coyotes. The need, once again, is for 
experimentation. 
Effects of Control Prior to the 1930's. - There appears little 
doubt, on the basis of historical records summarized by Dobie 
(1950), that coyotes were a very abundant animal in primeval 
North America. They continued at relatively high numbers around 
the turn of the 20th century, judging by reports summarized in 
Palmer (1897: 45) and Seton (1929), although Seton suggests that 
by this time they had been hunted to the point of some reduction. 
There are few long-term records which help to depict the 
trends in the early part of the present century up to the time of 
institutionalized predator control in the 1930's or 1940's. One 
perhaps instructive series of data is that reported by Keith (1963: 
167), who summarized fur returns of trappers in the three Prairie 
Provinces of Canada. These show strong, annual catches starting 
in 1919 and continuing, but perhaps in slightly declining numbers, 
to the middle 1940's, and generally dwindling at a more rapid 
rate thereafter to about 10 percent of the earlier catches. While 
this decline may in part be attributable to the decline in fur 
value, its severity might suggest some population decline. 
The widespread impression exists that the species was less 
numerous by the 1930's and 40's than in earlier times. Few people 
alive today have witnessed anything like the primeval numbers 
described by Dobie (1950). Yet, it is still an abundant and widely 
distributed animal in many areas, and has extended its range in 
North America during this century to a number of previously un-
occupied areas (Seton, 1929; Goldman, 1933). On the whole, it is 
nearly impossible to separate the relative roles of artificial control, 
and the profound land changes that have taken place on the con-
tinent in the last century and a half, in affecting coyote numbers. 
Effects of Control Since the 1930's. - Some aspects of coyote 
control can be tentatively evaluated for the period of the 1930's to 
the present for two reasons: (1) The Division of Wildlife Services 
records are fairly continuous through this period and provide a 
basis for measurement. (2) The newer toxicants - 1080 and 
coyote getters - were introduced in the 1940's. The years pre-
ceding the introduction of these methods can thus be considered 
as a pre-experimental control period, while the years follo,wing 
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their introduction can be considered the period in which the 
coyote-control variable is manipulated. It is not possible with 
available data to evaluate the effects of trapping, shooting, and 
denning because these have been in use throughout the period for 
which we have coyote population measurements. There is no way 
of separating out control and experimental periods. 
Coyotes-killed-per-man-year indices are shown in Figures 2a 
and 2b. The first generalization to be drawn from these figures 
is the short-term variability of coyote populations. Coyote numbers 
rise and fall at somewhere around 10- to l5-year intervals. Clark 
(1972) and Wagner (1972) observed short-term fluctuations in 
Curlew Valley and postulated that these were related to variations 
in numbers of the major dietary animal in the area, the black-
tailed jackrabbit. Gier (196B) observed annual changes in coyote 
reproductive rate with variations in the rodent populations of 
that area. And Keith (1963) documented widespread 10-year 
periodicities in coyote numbers in the Canadian Prairie Provinces 
which have been attributed by some observers to variations in 
snowshoe hare populations, but by others to unknown cyclic in-
fluences. 
Whatever the source of the changes, they take place during 
periods of fairly constant control effort in the United States, and 
in the absence of control in Canada. Consequently, they cannot 
be attributed to control efforts, or the lack thereof. 
A more promising approach is to calculate mean, annual 
population (index) levels for the pre- and post-lOBO and "getter" 
periods, and determine whether the average population densities 
have been lower during the era of lOBO use than in the preceding 
period. These averages are shown in Table 1. In some states, 
primarily the more northerly ones, the mean population density 
appears to have been lower than in the pre-lOBO era. However, 
in the more southerly states there appears to have been little 
difference in population density in the two periods. 
Division of Wildlife Services personnel contend that lOBO is 
a more effective control measure in the northern states than in 
the southern. In the north, the severity of winter weather causes 
food shortage for a coyote at a time when lower temperatures 
create a greater food need. The animals may move around more in 
search of food, and increase the chances of their contacting a lOBO 
bait station. Shortage of natural food forces them to utilize the 
poison-impregnated carrion of the station. In the southern states, 
milder climates and a greater abundance of food in the form of 
plant fruits and greater faunal diversity (Wagner, 1971) may 
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TABLE I-Comparison of Mean, Annual Population Indices for 
Years Previous to, and During, the Use of 1080 Poison1 
State 
Montana 
Wyoming 
Idaho 
Utah 
Nevada 
Colorado 
Arizona 
New Mexico 
Texas 
Mean, Annual No. Coyotes 
Taken Per Man-Year of Effort % Change Between 
Pre-1080 lOBO Period pre-lOBO and lOBO Means 
156 48 -69 
178 86 -52 
196 102 -48 
128 66 -48 
216 167 -23 
184 134 -27 
155 116 -23 
83 106 +29 
153 149 -3 
lSee text for calculation of coyotes-per-man-year index based on records 
of the Division of Wildlife Services. The indices are not comparable between 
states because the number of men employed by the Division, the coyote 
populations, and the extent to which different · control techniques are used 
vary between states. 
reduce the need for extensive movement and provide an adequacy 
of natural foods. 
All of this may be the case, but there has also been less 1080 
used in the southern states, perhaps because of its lower effective-
ness, as Division records show. When the extent of 1080 used is 
compared with the degree of pre- and post-1080 population change 
shown in Table 1, the evidence is rather strongly suggestive that 
1080 is an effective population depressant when used in substan-
tial amounts (Figure 2). 
This raises some suspicion in my own mind as to the effective-
ness of any of the other control measures. Texas has used com-
paratively little 1080, but has compensated with far heavier getter 
use than other states. Yet, the populations of 1950's to 60's have 
been essentially similar to those of the pre-getter era. Other meas-
ures are difficult to evaluate. Doubtless any technique, if applied 
intensively enough, would reduce population levels. But the ques-
tion is whether or not the techniques other than 1080, as presently 
used, have any material effect. There is no unequivocal answer 
available. 
Security of Coyotes as a Species. - Critics of predator control 
sometimes fear that control has brought the species to the brink 
of extinction, or at least placed it on the endangered list. As th~ 
evidence in Figures 2 and 3 suggests, there is some question that 
the control efforts of the past four decades have materially in-
fluenced numbers in some areas. Indeed, the Cain Report (Cain, 
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et aI., 1972) pointed out that as many coyotes have been taken 
over the country in recent years by the Division of Wildlife Services 
as were being taken 30 to 40 years ago, and suggested that the 
net effect of control might be that of a sustained-yield removal with 
little impact on population levels. 
Even in such states as Idaho, Wyoming, and Utah, where 
there is some evidence of post-lOBO reduction, that reduction may 
be no more than half the pre-lOBO density. Since the reduction, 
it would appear that the populations have achieved a new equili-
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brium and are fluctuating within new limits at these lower densi-
ties. 
It seems likely that the currently used control techniques 
will decline in effectiveness as time passes. Division trappers claim 
that the effectiveness of coyote-getters declined within a decade 
or so after their introduction, possibly because the animals learned 
to avoid them. Similarly, 1080 may select an increasingly resistant 
gene pool much as other biocides have done with other species. 
Division personnel decry the fact that coyotes too often will not 
use a 1080 bait, especially if natural foods are available. The 
implication of this might be a learning process. 
On the whole, the coyote is an extremely adaptable, flexible, 
and ubiquitous species in western United States. It inhabits a 
wide variety of environments from the tops of mountain ranges 
(including winter) to the bottoms of the deserts, and most inter-
vening types. It flourishes on the fringe of agricultural areas, 
and has moved into the suburban areas of a number of cities. There 
is evidence that control has affected its numbers in some areas, pri-
marily the more northerly states. But this effect may be less 
extreme than profound land changes of spreading urbanization and 
cultivation. There is reason to believe (cf. Clark, 1972; Wagner, 
1971; Frederick Knowlton, Unpub.) that food availability and 
quantity may be a more important determinant of density than 
human control measures in some areas, and in general food availa-
bility is probably an important ingredient in coyote numbers in 
all areas. Clark (1972) and Wagner (1971) concluded that if 
more food were available in their Utah-Idaho study area, coyotes 
would be more numerous even in the face of existing control 
measures. 
Coyote Increases of the Early 1970's. - As this is written in 
early 1972, there is a great deal of concern among stockmen over 
the evident increases in coyote numbers of the past two to three 
years. In implementing the recommendations of the Leopold Re-
port (Leopold et aI., 1964), the Division of Wildlife Services re-
duced to some degree the amount of 1080 used (cf. Cain et aI., 
1972), and restricted coyote control in areas where there is little 
sheep grazing. The fear is that this easing of control activities 
has led to the recent coyote increases. The view is shared by 
many Division personnel. 
While one cannot rule out the possibility that the reduction 
in 1080 use may be partly responsible, it does not seem likely that 
this is the entire, or even the main, influence. The Utah coyote 
population had declined from 1964 through 1967 (Figure 2a) - a 
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period in which the amount of lOBO used had been constant, 
and obviously this decline did not relate to any change in lOBO 
use. Rather, the decline was probably one of the naturally occuring 
fluctuations that characterize coyote populations as described 
above. 
Similar population declines (Figure 2a) had occurred in Utah 
between 1943 and 1947 (note that lOBO was first used in the state 
in 194B), and between 1953 and 195B (when lOBO use was con-
stant). Following each of these declines, the population increased 
again as oscillating populations characteristically do. The increases 
occurred in the face of lOBO use, as the present increase is doing 
even if the lOBO use has been reduced by one-third. 
It seems entirely possible that the present coyote increase 
is part of the natural fluctuation pattern. And if it is, we can 
probably look for another decline period within a few years, say 
two to four. The effect of reduced lOBO use will more likely be a 
slight increase in the range of densities through which the popula-
tion fluctuates over a period of years. Figure 3 would suggest that, 
if lOBO use continues for a period of years at a level of about 1200 
stations, as in 1969 and 1970, the mean coyote population level 
would be about 40 percent lower than the pre-lOBO period instead 
of the 50 percent reduction that has characterized the 1949 to 1971 
period. 
PATTERN OF SHEEP Loss AND EFFECTS OF CONTROL 
The basic questions for which we need allilwers are about 
three-fold under this topic: (1) What is the magnitude of sheep 
losses to predation? (2) How does that magnitude relate to coyote 
abundance? (3) How is the magnitude influenced by coyote 
control? Answers to these questions again fall back on the prob-
lems of measurement. Questions (2) and (3) can be answered to 
some degree by biased estimates of losses, as long as the degree 
of bias is constant, or by indices of losses much as we used indices 
of coyote population density above to analyze the impact of con-
trol measures on coyote numbers. And once again, answers to 
these questions require an experimental situation: manipulation of 
the coyote-density variable, or of the predator-control variable, and 
observation on the effect of this manipulation on sheep loss levels. 
Question (1) requires accurate estimates of the number and 
proportion of sheep lost to predation. Any analysis of loss eco-
nomics, or of the cost-benefit economics of predator control, de-
pends on accurate loss measurement. Such accuracy is difficult 
to obtain, and most of the existing estimates are challenged by 
opponents of predator control. The credibility problem lies in the 
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fact that most of the existing estimates depend on interview data 
from stockmen, and the judgment of the interviewee as to the cause 
of death. As !s well known, sheep die from a variety of causes: 
genetic birth defects, inadequate mother's milk, diseases and para-
sites of various kinds, accidents, inclement weather, toxic plants, 
and predators. In addition, losses occur when animals stray from 
flocks and when inadvertently left on summer range after removal 
in fall. 
Separating predator losses from among these is often difficult. 
A lamb that died of birth defects or malnutrition, and was scav-
enged by predators, may appear to have been a predator kill. 
Or a weakened animal that would have died from other causes, 
might fall prey to a predator. 
Another source of bias may be in the self-protective behavior 
of some sheep herders and other employees. A herder who, through 
lack of proper care, loses some animals may protect his position 
by claiming that the animals were killed by predators. In addition, 
it is conceivable that some ranchers may overestimate predator 
losses under the influence of the present, heated predator-control 
climate. Consequently, it is difficult not to assume some inflation 
of nearly all interview data on sheep losses. 
For the most part, the sheep industry has operated on faith 
that predator control reduces sheep losses sufficiently to warrant 
funds in excess of the $4 million which it expends annually on the 
effort. That assumption needs to be examined in the light of evi-
dence that control efforts may have little impact on coyote num-
bers in some areas, and because of the possible detrimental effects 
of control. 
Mg.gnitude of Sheep Losses. - The Nielson and Curle (1970) 
study may provide the best estimate of sheep losses available be-
cause of the pains taken to minimize the biases. Based on a 20 
percent sample of Utah sheep ranchers, these investigators gath-
ered their data through personal contact and oral interview. Sheep-
men were asked to estimate their total losses during fiscal 196B-69, 
and using particular care, to report the number of sheep lost to 
predators. 
The results showed an average predator loss of 61 ewes and 
lambs per 1,000 ewes. Since lamb losses made up about two-thirds 
of the total, these data suggest about 20 ewes lost per thousand 
ewes (or 2 percent) and about 40 lambs lost per thousand ewes. 
Figures were not reported on the lamb crop but. based on typical 
lamb-crop figures, it probably fell somewhere between BOO and 
1,000 lambs per 1,000 ewes. On this basis, lamb loss approached 
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4 to 5 percent, and overall sheep losses approached 3 percent of 
the flocks. Coyotes were reported as being the major cause of 
predatory loss. It should be noted that this loss was estimated for 
a single year in which statewide coyote numbers were relatively 
low (Figures 1 and 2). 
The Crop and Livestock Reporting Service estimates sum-
marized by Reynolds and Gustad (1971) were based on a mailed 
questionnaire to a sample of stockmen in four western states. 
The estimates from this poll varied between 3.6 and 7.9 percent 
loss of sheep to predators in different states and different years. 
Once again, coyotes were reported as being the major offender. 
The Morris estimates described above produced loss figures 
that ranged mostly between 7 and 10 percent prior to the 1940's. 
From the late 1940's to the mid 1960's, after which Morris retired, 
predator losses were estimated to fall mostly between 2 and 4 per-
cent. This agrees very closely with the Nielson-Curle estimates. 
The Forest Service estimates for the level of predator losses 
occuring during the summer grazing season on the National Forests 
range between 0.4 and 1.5 percent. Nielson and Curle found the 
heaviest losses occuring on the lambing grounds and on the winter 
ranges in Utah. Hence the Forest Service estimates are in accord 
with the Nielson-Curle estimates in that the former takes place 
between these two seasons of heaviest loss, and for a period of 
perhaps no more than about 4 months out of the year. 
Except for the Reynolds and Gustad (1971) study, the Crop 
and Livestock Reporting Service estimates only the magnitude of 
losses due to all causes. Predator losses are not asked for on their 
questionnaires or estimated separately. However, these estimates 
are of value because they place an upper limit on predator loss since 
the latter obviously cannot exceed the total. And since sheep die 
from a variety of causes, it must be true that the losses due to 
predators lie to some unknown degree below the total-loss rates. 
Furthermore, as mentioned above, these total-loss estimates may 
be the most reliable estimates we have because they involve no 
interpretation of the cause of death. They require only that the 
rancher have a reasonably accurate count of his first-of-the-year 
inventory, his lamb crop, the number of lambs he sells during the 
year, and his year-end inventory. The difference between these 
values must be the total losses due to all causes. 
A word is in order as to how the percentages were estimated 
for this report. At the suggestion of Grant Lea, the number of 
"stock" sheep, as reported in the Statistical Reporting Service's 
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annual summary entitled "Livestock and Poultry," was used as the 
number of breeder sheep in the calculations in order to avoid 
counting feeder lambs (the latter are included in the first-of-the 
year "total" sheep counts) because these lambs are kept in feed 
lots and have little exposure to predation. To the number of "stock 
sheep" was added the item termed "lambs saved" in the annual 
publications from the Bureau of Agricultural Economics for each 
year in each state. This is the number of lambs docked. Docking 
takes place some time after lambing-e.g. , as much as two months 
in Texas. Hence use of the docking count to estimate lamb losses 
gives no provision for losses between lambing and docking. The 
sum of "stock sheep" and "lambs saved" was taken as the total 
number of sheep for the beginning of each year, and this sum was 
divided into the sum of the two values "sheep deaths" and "lamb 
deaths." This provided a yearly estimate for each state of the 
percentage of "stock sheep" and lambs lost during the year to all 
causes. 
These annual percentages were then averaged for the period 
1924 to 1970 for nine western states (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, 
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Utah and Wyoming). The 
percentages are remarkably constant over the years, and between 
states. The lowest state was Idaho at 7.9 percent, and the highest 
Nevada at 11.3. All of the others fell between 8.5 and 10.6. Preda-
tor losses on the average, must therefore be some unknown degree 
less than about 8 to 11 percent in these states, on the average. 
In light of this, Morris's estimates of 7 to 10 percent prior to the 
late 1940's . seem improbable, and this may cast some doubt on 
the accuracy of the later, but lower, estimates. 
Statistical Distribution of Losses. - One cannot meet with 
stockmen's groups on the subject of predator control without hear-
ing a number of these sincere and forthright men attest to heavy 
predator losses. Yet the growing evidence seems to point in many 
cases to the conclusion that such losses, on the average, are rela-
tively light. This seeming paradox can perhaps be resolved by a 
look at the frequency distribution of the losses. 
The only raw data avaliable were those generously provided 
by Dr. Nielson which were obtained in the Nielson and Curle 
(1970) study. These are shown in Figure 4, and may resolve the 
question. The majority of ranchers in Nielson's and Curle's sample 
experienced relatively light losses: 80 percent of this sample sus-
tained losses of 50 ewes and lambs per 1,000 ewes or less. If we 
use the same formula for converting these to percentages as used 
above, four-fifths of the ranchers sustained predator losses of 2.5 
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Frequency Distribution of the Number of Ranchers Losing Different 
Numbers of Ewes and Lambs to Predators in Utah (Data from Nielson and 
Curle, Unpub.). 
percent or less in Utah in 1968-69. Only 20 percent sustained 
losses in the higher range. If this is a typical, annual distribution, 
then some ranchers will sustain heavy losses each year. On the 
basis of these results, they will be a minority, percentagewise. 
But the number of sheepmen in Utah must approximate 300 to 400. 
Twenty percent of that total is 60 to 80, and in any group there 
will always be a number of individuals who have had sizeable 
losses. 
Effectiveness of Control in Reducing Sheep Losses. - As 
discussed above, coyote-control activities potentially can reduce 
sheep losses in two ways: (1) In the trouble-shooting type of 
control where a coyote preying on a flock is apprehended, and (2) 
in the general population reduction of coyotes on the assumption 
that the level of sheep losses is some function of coyote density. 
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Division of Wildlife Services personnel are repeatedly confronted 
with situations in which one or a few coyotes prey upon a sheep 
flock. When these offending animals are removed, the losses stop 
and there seems little question that control has, in these instances, 
reduced the level of loss that would have been experienced without 
apprehension of the offenders. 
Yet, the effectiveness of this mode of reduction is almost im-
possible to measure. The real question we wish to ask is the 
extent to which losses are reduced with trouble-shooting control 
below what they would be without that kind of control. No one 
would advocate that control be withheld and that losses be al-
lowed to continue in order to provide the "with" and "without" 
measurements. Hence, the evidence is not at hand to evaluate 
trouble-shooting control quantitatively. 
Some tentative indications can be gained on the contribution 
of population control. The cyclic rises and falls of coyote popula-
tions, as well as generalized reduction through control efforts, con-
stitute de facto experiments. For one can measure sheep losses 
as coyote densities vary and determine whether or not, and to 
what extent, sheep losses vary. 
The various predator-loss figures of the Division of Wildlife 
Services, including the Morris estimates, and those of the Forest 
Service are plotted over time in Figure 5 for Utah, Wyoming, and 
Colorado. All of these sources of data suggest a reduction in the 
level of sheep predatory losses, whatever their true magnitude, 
in the late 1940's. This reduction coincides with the decline in 
coyote numbers in these states at about the same time (Figure 2). 
The Morris data suggest a reduction of sheep predatory losses 
in the late 1940's roughly similar in magnitude to the reduction in 
Utah coyote populations: i.e., somewhere near one-half or more. 
Hence, if abandoning 1080 use and whatever else promoted the 
1949-50 decline enabled the coyote population to return to the 
level of the early 1940's, Utah sheep predatory losses, whatever 
their true magnitude, might increase by a factor of two or more. 
These combined sets of data suggest that there is a correlation 
between coyote population density and the level of sheep losses. 
And it follows that generalized coyote population reduction does 
appear, at least on the basis of these data, to reduce the level of 
sheep predatory losses. 
The remaining set of data to be examined is the Crop and 
Livestock Reporting Service annual estimates of total loss that 
were described above. In the final analysis, it is the degree to 
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Predation Losses of Sheep in Three States Reported by Division of Wildlife 
Services and U.S. Forest Service (See Text for Sources). 
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TABLE 2-Mean, Annual Percentage of Sheep Dying from all 
Causes Previous to, and During, the Use of lOBO Poison' 
Mean, Annual Percent of Sheep Lost 
State 1924-39 1940-49 1950-70 
Montana _____ __ ____________ ___________________ ___ __ ___ __ B.5 8.4 10.3 
Wyoming ___ __ ____ ____ ____ __ ___ _____ ______ ___ ____________ 9.1 7.9 B.4 
Idaho __ ________ __ _____ ___ ______ ____ __ ___ ___ _____ ___ __ ____ __ B.6 8.4 7.0 
Utah __ ___ __ ____ __ ____ __ ______ ___________ __ __ __ __ ._______ __ 10.9 11.1 9.4 
Nevada _____ _____ _______ __ __________ __ ______ ____ ____ _____ 12.2 11.7 10.3 
Colorado _____________ ____ _____ ______ ______ ____ ___ _______ 10.2 9.4 9.1 
Arizona ____ ___ __ _____ __________ ____ ____ ______ ____ _____ ___ 10.3 8.6 7.9 
New Mexico _____________ ___ ___ _________ ____ ______ ____ 10.9 10.5. 10.B 
Texas _______ _____ _______ _____ _____ __ _____ ___ ___ ______ ____ __ 9.4 10.3 11.3 
Mean ____ _____________________ ___ __ ______ ___ ___ __ ____ __ ____ 10.0 9.6 ' 9.4 
' The percentages are calculated from the records of the U.S_D .A_ Crop 
and Livestock Reporting Service_ The 1940-49 is considered to be the decade 
immediately preceding widespread, general 1080 use. The substance has 
been in general use throughout the 1950-70 period. 
which predator-control operations reduce total losses that they 
make their economic contributions. We discussed above the possi-
bility that biases may enter into the estimates of predatory losses, 
but that the total-loss estimates may be free of these biases. 
We saw that predatory loss estimates appear to vary with coyote 
density and control activities, but if these estimates do prove to be 
substantially biased, it is conceivable that total-loss estimates are 
not correlated with coyote numbers. 
Annual, total-loss rates for nine western states are summarized 
in Table 2, and are averaged for the periods 1924-1939, 1940-1949, 
and 1950-1970. There are uncertainties as to how uniform a set 
of data that goes back nearly 50 years may be. Hence the break-
down between an early era, a 10-year period immediately prior 
to lOBO use, and a 21-year period during which lOBO has had 
continuous use. 
These results show little, if any, change in the level of sheep 
lost between the 1940's, and the lOBO period. Among the more 
northerly states in which some reduction in coyote numbers w~s 
suggested in Figure 2, three showed; some reduction in losses 
(Idaho, Utah, Nevada), two showed increase (Montana, Wyo-
ming), and one showed essentially no change (Colorado). Among 
the southern states which showed little change in post-lOBO 
coyote numbers, one state showed decrease (Arizona), one no 
change (New Mexico), and one showed increase (Texas). Grouped 
together, they suggest little if any change in sheep losses. 
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Those which do show a reduction only experienced a reduction of 
around one-and-a-half percent. 
The loss rates are amazingly constant over the years, and in 
those states in Figure 2 which suggested 2- to 3-fold fluctuations in 
coyote numbers, there is no parallel change in annual percentage 
of sheep lost to all causes. 
General Discussion on Effectiveness of Control in Reducing 
Sheep Losses. - There have now been completed a number of 
coyote food-habits studies covering much of the western half of 
the United States (cf. Clark, 1972; Ellis and Shemnitz, 1958; 
Ferrel et al., 1953; Gier, 1968; Young 'and Jackson, 1951). None 
of these has ever shown livestock to be a major part of the diet. 
Coyotes characteristically feed primarily on rodent, rabbits, and 
carrion, and in some areas on plant material. 
But the opponents of coyote control cannot take encourage-
ment in this fact alone, nor should the proponents take excep-
tion. It has been pointed out repeatedly that the frequency of a 
prey item in the predator's diet - whether based on stomach 
and scat analyses, remains around dens, or remains in nests of 
raptors - is no criterion of the impact of predator on prey (cf. 
Latham, 1950; Wagner et al., 1967). Rather, the important 
criterion is the percentage of the prey population taken, and this 
depends not only on the frequency of kill per predator, but also 
on the numbers of both predators and prey. 
To use the case of Utah sheep as an example, there were 
roughly 1,700,000 sheep in the state in 1970. If there were 
20,000 coyotes in the state in the same year, as seems entirely 
possible, and each killed 3 sheep that year, the total kill of 
60,000 would be roughly 3 percent of the total, the percentage 
as calculated by Nielson and Curle (1970). Yet if the sheep meat 
only appeared 3 days in each animal's diet, it appeared in less 
than 1 percent of the 365 days in the year. A food-habits study 
would find sheep remains to be an extremely rare dietary item. 
The problem is to determine the percentage of sheep killed by 
coyotes, and the degree to which coyote population control meas-
ures affect this percentage. There is no evidence available to assess 
the degree to which pre-lOBO control measures reduced coyote 
populations. One cannot avoid the suspicion that measures other 
than toxicants are of limited effectiveness-indeed there is some 
indication that toxicants themselves have limited effectiveness in 
some areas - but this is largely speculation. The evidence does 
suggest that lOBO achieved some measure of population reduction 
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in some states. And there is some evidence that sheep predatory 
losses are correlated with coyote population density. Hence, any 
reduction in coyote populations would occasion reduction in sheep 
predatory losses. 
Yet, the evidence on total sheep losses shows little, if any, 
correlation with coyote population density and the use of control 
measures which reduce that density. Several explanatins can be 
suggested to explain this paradox: (1) One or both sets of data 
may have inherent statistical biases which render the comparison 
invalid. (2) The true level of sheep predatory losses may be so 
low that cutting it in half does not materially change the level of 
total losses. (3) The predatory and non-predatory losses are 
somewhat compensatory. For example, coyotes may often take 
sheep which would die anyway due to sickness, malnutrition, or 
other causes. The result is that the loss level would be much the 
same with or without predatory loss. There is almost certainly 
some degree of competing probability among the various causes 
of loss. Obviously, some animals saved from one cause of death 
will die from another. 
There is no basis for selecting from among these alternatives 
at present. Truth may consist of some combination of them. They 
do, however, introduce a good deal of uncertainty as to what the 
true picture is. And they raise a valid question as to just how 
important predatory losses are, and how much value is derived 
from generalized coyote population control. 
EFFECTS OF CONTROL ON OTHER ANIMALS IN THE 
ECOSYSTEM 
The two most likely ways in which coyote control activities 
might affect other animals in the ecosystem are (1) by direct, 
inadvertent reduction of nontarget species, especially carnivores, 
which are caught or poisoned by devices placed over the landscape 
for coyotes; and (2) by the increase of prey species formerly held 
in check by coyote predation (or predation of other carnivores 
inadvertently reduced by coyote control). In both of these cases, 
an experimental perspective is again in order: (1) What were the 
densities of nontarget carnivores before and after institution of con-
trol measures? (2) What are prey animal densities at different 
coyote population levels, and therefore different predation levels of 
coyotes? 
Here again it is important that we maintain a population 
perspective. In their well-placed concern for our fauna, opponents 
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of predator control have noted with alarm that some nontarget 
animals have been found dead in the vicinity of 1080 stations. 
And some advocates of control have pointed to the desirable 
animals killed by coyotes. But as we have seen above in the case 
of the coyote, one cannot judge the effect on a species from the 
loss of some individuals. A quantitative overview is essential for 
an understanding of what is happening to a species. 
Effects on Nontarge.t Carnzvores. - The Division of Wildlife 
Services has kept annual records of the number of carnivorous 
mammals of different species which they have taken inadvertently 
each year during the course of predator-control operations. These 
can be calculated on a predators-taken-per-man-year basis, as in 
the way we treated the coyote data above. 
The animals are largely taken in traps set for coyotes, and 
variations in the degrees to which traps have been used poses 
a bias. There has been a gradual reduction of trap use over the 
past few decades, and a very abrupt reduction in the last 10 years. 
Thus, in Utah the Division used 4,026 traps in 1961, and 1,572 in 
1970, a reduction of nearly two thirds. Hence, this source of bias 
must be borne in mind in interpreting the results. And again as 
in the case of the coyote, the early predator-control measures 
of trapping, using strychnine, and some shooting developed gradu-
ally before records were available to evaluate the effects. Hence, 
our attention must be turned largely to the pre-1080 and 1080 
years for which we have "before" and "after" data, and which 
serve as the cont rol and experimental phases of our experiment. 
The number of animals caught per man-year of effort for 
several species (Figure 6) shows a strong increase in Utah and 
Wyoming in the late 1940's at about the time 1080 was first used 
and coyote populations were declining (Figure 2) . These are 
states with heavy 1080 use (Figure 3). Montana and Colorado 
data show the same pattern, as do Nevada and Idaho data for 
bobcat. Nevada data for other species are incomplete, while Idaho 
data do not show similar trends for other carnivores. 
The increasing catch for these species would seem to imply 
population increase, contrary to the claims of many authors that 
their numbers are being reduced by predator control. Indeed, since 
the period shown in Figure 6 was one of declining trap use, the true 
extent to which these species increased may be underestimated. 
The sharp decline in catch in tlie 1960's coincides with the abrupt 
reduction in trap use described above. 
These cases bear out a frequent claim made by Division 
personnel that reduction of one carnivorous species in an area 
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results in the increase of another. Thus, Owen Morris, former 
Utah state director of the Division once told me that coyotes in-
creased in the Intermountain West after elimination of the timber 
wolf. Other trappers have told me that coyotes and bobcats fre-
quently display reciprocal population fluctuations, and that red 
foxes increased in the western parts of the Dakotas after reduction 
in coyote numbers. 
There are hints of the same phenomena in the literature. 
Krefting (1970) reported the disappearance of coyotes on Isle 
Royal following the arrival of timber wolves on the island, and D. 
L. Allen (Personal Communication) has told me of evidence that 
wolves kill foxes on the same island. Goldman (1933) reported 
altercations between coyotes and foxes when the former spread 
into Alaska in the early part of this century, and eventual decline 
of foxes. 
The implication seems to be that interspecific population 
regulatory processes exist between these species in the same 
trophic level, with perhaps the larger Canidae the more aggressive, 
dominant forms. It is uncertain whether the interactions are 
direct, aggressive ones, or whether they are based on competition 
for a common food supply. Elsewhere (Wagner, 1969), I have 
summarized a number of similar cases where heavy exploitation 
and reduction of one animal species led to marked increases of 
competitors which were not similarly exploited. And it is perhaps 
significant that nontarget carnivorous species in two southern 
states (Texas and Arizona), where coyote numbers may not have 
been so markedly reduced, did not show the response which these 
species showed in the northern states (Figure 6). Here again, the 
evidence is not unequivocal. Nontarget carnivores in New Mexico 
did seem to undergo increase similar to those in the northern states. 
Whether or not the implied increases of these carnivores have 
been due to coyote reduction, or to other unknown influences, the 
main point is that control activities directed at coyotes are not 
seriously imperilling at least the species surveyed here. This would 
tend to bear out the Division's contention that 1080 is substan-
tially coyote specific because of its canid specificity, and because 
of the wide distances at which the baits are placed which tend to 
keep them away from many individuals of these relatively less 
mobile species. 
The point is not intended to disarm concern for endangered 
species, or those for which we have no data. McNulty's (1971) 
concern for the black-footed ferret's plight is certainly well taken, 
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as is the concern of Leopold et aI., (1964) for the Sierra del Nido 
grizzly bear. And the fact that 1080 should have been placed 
within the cruising radius of the few remaining California condors 
(Leopold et aI., 1964) is inconceivable. But with the exception 
of such species, the evidence does not point to the profound effects 
of 1080 use on non-target species that is sometimes feared. We 
have seen that, in some states, the evidence even raises the ques-
tion as to whether the target species, the coyote, is materially 
influenced. 
One species for which there is concern in recent years is the 
kit fox, and its apparent decline in numbers is charged against pre-
dator control. This may be true, but as data like the ones un-
earthed in this study repeatedly produce results contrary to pre-
vailing impression - the seeming lack of impact of control on 
southern coyote populations, the seeming lack of correlation 
between coyote numbers and total sheep losses, and the seeming 
increase of nontarget carnivores which supposedly are being re-
duced by the use of poisons - one finds it difficult not to with-
hold judgment on such claims until critical evidence is at hand. 
Our land is experiencing profound changes from a variety of 
human influences. If a species like the kit fox has declined, it is 
perhaps too easy to ascribe the change to some unpopular scape-
goat like predator control when in fact the decline may be due to 
far more pervasive and subtle changes in the ecosystem. The kit 
fox is primarily a denison of southern deserts. As we have seen 
above, the amount p-of 1080 used in these areas is rather low by 
comparison with states farther north. 
Effects on Big Game Animals. - One of the justifications 
commonly cited by advocates of predator control is that popula-
tions of big game species are increased by the reduction of large 
predators. Indeed in an early, milestone paper, Leopold et aI. , 
(1947) pointed out the widespread tendency for deer populations 
in North America to increase sharply during this century, and 
ascribed these eruptions to the triumverate of habitat change, 
protective laws, and removal of large carnivores. The Kaibab 
Plateau deer eruption in Arizona (Rasmussen, 1941) has been 
repeatedly cited ex post facto as the classical example of what 
occurs in a deer population when the predatory checks are removed. 
In several recent studies, evidence has been presented of the actual 
limiting influence of large predators on ungulate populations (cf. 
Mech, 1966; Hirst, 1969). 
Yet, there probably are more studies which find predation 
by large carnivores to have little impact on ungulate densities (cf. 
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Leopold, 1955; Talbot and Talbot, 1963; Pimlott, 1967; Hor-
nocker, 1970). And upon recent reanalysis of the available evi-
dence, Caughley (1970) raised a serious question as to whether 
removal of predators did play a significant role in the Kaibab 
deer eruption. The basic problem is that in most cases of North 
American deer eruptions, predation has not been the only variable 
manipulated. The other, and perhaps more important, variable 
has been the improvement of habitat and food supply: Cutting 
and regrowth of mature forests in the East, and invasion of shrub-
by species into grazing lands in the western part of the continent. 
The result is to create a considerable amount of uncertainty as 
to the role of predators in limiting ungulate populations, especially 
the versatile and fecund deer species. 
Many Divisions of Wildlife Services personnel and some west-
ern game biologists strongly suspect that coyotes are a significant 
influence on deer numbers. The former' commonly attribute the 
increase in deer in the first half of this century to their control 
efforts. 
The general view among perhaps a majority of game biologists 
is that coyotes are inept animals at preying on deer, and that 
kills are infrequent. Division men challenge this view and aver 
that coyote predation on deer is a more common event than is 
widely believed. 
These men are among the most skilled field observers in the 
wildlife field. Their observations would almost certainly carry 
weight even with the realization that their vested interest may 
shade their interpretation of the observations. By late winter, 
deer are weakened by food shortages, and in deep snow are vulner-
able to predation. 
But the problem here again is that of drawing inferences 
from observations on individual kills to the significance of total 
population phenomena. Historically, deer populations increased 
over much of the United States in the 1920's, 1930's and 1940's. 
Overpopulation symptoms were common in the 1940's (Leonard, 
1946; Leopold et al., 1947). In Utah, deer were scarce when 
European man arrived in the state in the 19th century. They 
increased during the first half of this century, and probably reached 
a peak in the late 1940's (Anon., 1966). Since such coyote-control 
agents as coyote-getters, 1080, and thallium were first put in use 
in the latter 1940's, most of these deer increases had taken place 
before coyote reductions induced by these toxicants. 
I would certainly not suggest that there may not be some 
deer herds in western United States which are materially influenced 
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by coyote predation. Knowlton (1964) and Cook et al. (1971) 
have presented a convincing case for the Welder Refuge' on the 
Texas coast with an especially heavy coyote density. But, on the 
basis of existing evidence, one is inclined to remain uncertain that 
coyote predation is of wide, general significance. And the impli-
cation is to question how much coyote control contributes to deer 
management. I do not wish to imply that I view the question of the 
role of predation or ungulate populations anywhere near a closed 
issue. Most of the existing studies are on single predatory species: 
wolves, mountain lions, or coyotes. The realities of a pristine, 
multi-species predatory pressure on deer - wolves, mountain 
lions, bobcats, coyotes, and bear - may be a very different story 
from the effects of anyone of these. 
There is some, although not unequivocal, evidence that coyote 
predation acts as a depressant on pronghorn antelope populations 
(cf. Udy, 1953; Arrington and Edwards, 1951; recent unpublished 
evidence of Frederick Knowlton). Knowlton (Personal Communi-
cation) has pointed out that the Wyoming antelope populations 
did not really begin to thrive until the beginning of 1080 use. 
Workers in several other states have not found similar evidence, 
but the question runs like a thread back through the literature 
to early accounts cited by Seton (1929) and Dobie (1950). The 
frequency and distribution of the observations make it seem a 
real possibility that coyotes do, in some cases, exert some limita-
tion on antelope numbers. 
Effects on Small Prey Species. - Opponents of predator con-
trol have contended that the practice is unwise because predators 
hold small mammal populations in check. These species allegedly 
erupt into pest status in the absence of predatory restraint. These 
contentions bring us into an area that is even more complex and 
frought with uncertainty than the question of predatory restraints 
on ungulate numbers. That uncertainty arises from the same rea-
sons as the uncertainties existing in the subjects discussed above: 
The absence of effective measurement, and the infrequency with 
which an experimental approach is used. Although there has been 
a great deal of research on predation, and a vast literature exists on 
the subject, answers to the difficult population questions still re-
main uncertain: To what extent do individual predatory species, 
and combinations thereof, influence the density of prey popula-
tions, and under what circumstances? 
Time and space do not permit lengthy exposition of the sub-
ject here, but there is a strong body of opinion among animal 
ecologists that highly fecund small mammal species undergo pro-
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found population changes which relate largely to weather, food and 
habitat conditions, and disease and parasites. The influence of 
anyone pre atory species in this complex may well be, more often 
than not, relatively minor. At best, perceptible predatory influence 
may require the impact of aggregates of predator species (cf. 
Craighead and Craighead, 1956). 
In particular, rodent population densities over western United 
States seem to be importantly influenced by vegetation changes, 
often those associated with grazing. This subject was reviewed at 
some length by D. L. Allen in Section III-D of the Cain Report. 
Our own studies of recent years give some clue to the effective-
ness of coyote predation on black-tailed jackrabbit populations 
(Stoddart, 1970, 1971; Wagner and Stoddart, 1972) in north-
western Utah and southern Idaho. The jackrabbit is the dietary 
staple for the coyote in this area, and in some years coyote preda-
tion was by far the major cause of jackrabbit mortality. How-
ever, the coyote population fluctuates, apparently because its 
food supply does so as well. As coyotes decline, their impact on the 
simultaneously declining rabbits eases. The point is eventually 
reached at which the rabbit population is released. With a higher 
reproductive rate than the coyotes, they need but a year or two 
of relatively unrestrained increase and the coyotes can no longer 
catch them even though they too have now begun to inrease. 
The eventual curtailment and initial decline of jackrabbits 
appears due perhaps to the onset of disease, perhaps exhaustion of 
the food supply, perhaps self-induced reduction in reproductive 
rate due to stress of high density and social unrest, or some com-
bination of these. Once the rabbits have begun to decline, the 
now abundant coyotes once again exist in a high ratio to rabbit 
numbers, and their predation begins once again to have a material 
impact. 
Hence, the effect of the coyote appears to be primarily one 
of hastening and deepening the decline phase of the rabbit popula-
tion oscillation. The maximum densities to which the rabbits in-
crease do not appear influenced by coyote predation, and in total 
coyote predation does not appear to be a significant determinant 
of rabbit numbers. This conclusion appears supported by Palmer's 
(1897:45) early report of high rabbit and coyote number in this 
same area prior to any kind of institutionalized predator control. 
In short, I am rather skeptical of the effectiveness of coyote 
predation alone in determining the density of small mammal popu-
lations, and by inference the claim that coyote control has been a 
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significant influence in producing pest populations of small mam-
mals. Collective, interspecies predator populations may be a dif-
ferent story. 
ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 
Obviously the major emphasis of this report is in the ecological 
aspects. I have neither the economic expertise nor any great deal of 
new infonnation to make any major addition to what has already 
been said about the economic aspects of the question. Yet, the 
economic considerations begin with the ecological: What is the 
magnitude of sheep loss and what are the costs of any given degree 
of reduction in coyote numbers and in sheep loss. Some of the 
findings from this study shed some light on several economic con-
siderations. 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES 
Several comparisons have been made of the costs of predator 
control and the economic value of the sheep lost to predators 
(d. Evanson, 1967, for review of such comparisons). The impli-
cation seems to be that this is tantamount to a cost-benefit ana-
lysis, with a high ratio of sheep-loss value to control cost implying 
a favorable cost-benefit situation. Viewed in this way, and with 
the existing estimates of predatory loss (d. Reynolds and Gustad, 
1971), the ratios are usually quite favorable. 
For example, the Nielson-Curle (1970) study suggested a 3 
percent predatory loss rate, and a total sheep loss in Utah valued 
at a little over $1 million. In this same year, Division of Wildlife 
Services records show a total budget of about $300,000 of which 
sheepmen contributed about half plus an additional $56,000 of 
privately financed control (Nielson and Curle, 1970). Hence, 
regardless of whether we contemplate the ratio of public funds or 
of industry funds, or of the total control outlay to sheep loss, 
it is a favorable one. (It should be pointed out that Nielson and 
Curle did not make this type of cost-benefit comparison. I have 
only used their data here to illustrate this type of comparison.) 
However, this would seem to be a specious comparison, for 
the funds spent on predator control clearly are not preventing the 
3 percent loss. Hence, the economic value of that loss can hardly 
be viewed as a benefit of the control cost. The proper comparison 
would seem to be the cost of control weighed against the value of 
sheep tha.t would be lost without that control. This latter is clearly 
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a difficult figure to obtain, and no definite answer can be obtained. 
But two sets of figures can be the basis for speculative compari-
sons, at least for the degree of control achieved by 1080. 
In the more northerly states, 1080 may have cut coyote popu-
la tions roughly in half (Figure 3). And those sets of data on 
sheep predatory loss which extended over somr years of both 
the pre-1080 and 1080 periods (Figure 5) sugges~, r! a reduction 
of about one-half. Hence, on the basis of these figul'e& .l.bandon-
ment of 1080 might conceivably witness a two-fold increase in 
coyote populations and sheep predatory losses, whatever their 
true level. And herein lies the key consideration. 
If the Nielson'Curle estimate of 3 percent is near the truth, 
then sheep losses might be expected to increase 3 percent. And in 
this case, we would arrive at the same cost-benefit ratio calculated 
above for Utah. 
But in the analyses above, the total-loss rates of sheep in 
northern states hardly changed following 1080 use (Table 2). 
Losses in some states declined slightly, increased in others suggest-
ing some statistical variation and raising the question of whether 
total loss rates were changed at all by the use of 1080. At best, 
the reductions were no more than 1 or 1.5 percent lower, implying 
that if 1080 were abandoned, the total losses would rise by no more 
than this amount at best. At 1 percent increased loss of Utah 
sheep, the ratio of present predator-control cost to value of sheep 
saved now becomes about 1: 1, or in other words no gain on the 
expenditure. 
All of this is speculative, of course, because of the uncertain-
ties surrounding the available loss estimates. These uncertainties 
emphasize the need for critical, carefully taken measurements of 
losses. 
LIVESTOCK INSURANCE 
A great deal has been said about the possibility of loss insur-
ance as an alternate means of economic protection to predator 
control. Most opponents of predator control wish no economic 
hardship on sheep men, and many indicate a willingness to sup-
port an insurance program as an alternate. This possibility was 
discussed at some length in the Cain Report, and will only be 
touched on briefly here. 
To begin with, the prospect of an insurance program to 
cover predatory losses alone seems forbidding. It is difficult to 
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identify predator kills in many cases, and the cost of investigating 
all such claims would seem to be prohibitively expensive. With 
several hundred sheep ranchers in each major sheep state, each 
sustaining some predatory losses each year, the claim adjustment 
problem seems out of the question. 
However, total-loss insurance would seem to have more 
promise. Sheepmen now lose animals from a variety of causes, 
perhaps averaging somewhere around 8 to 11 percent (Table 2). 
These are losses for which they have no protection, and which 
cut substantially into their profit margin. The administrative 
advantage of total-loss insurance is that no interpretations of the 
cause of loss are required and the claim adjustment problem 
greatly simplified. 
Losses could perhaps be ascertained by comparing January 1 
inventories plus the lamb crop with the number of lambs sold each 
year, plus the December 31 inventory. The difference would be 
the number of sheep lost to all causes. Verification of figures could 
perhaps be coupled with tax assessment which also requires an 
inventory and which could provide a check. 
Some critics of the insurance idea contend that fraudulent 
claims would scuttle such a plan, or that inept and inefficient op-
erators would benefit at the expense of skilled sheepmen who main-
tained their losses at low levels. Premiums could perhaps be ad-
justed to an operator's loss record, and be subject to annual review. 
This would enable the better, more successful operators to enjoy 
the benefit of lower rates. 
Some speculative figures for the state of Utah might be as 
follows: Utah ranchers grazed roughly 1.7 million sheep in the 
state in fiscal 1970-71 (incorrectly given in the Cain report as 1 
million). Losses in recent years (Table 2) have averaged about 9 
percent, but let us use 10 as a round figure and on the possibility 
that some abatement of predator control would permit some in-
crease in predation. Hence, the loses due to all causes would be 
roughly 170,000. At a mean value of $20 per head, the value of the 
losses would approach $3.4 million. On a statewide basis, a levy 
of roughly $2 per head would fully underwrite such losses. 
On the average, this outlay would return to the industry 
as payment of claims, and the industry as a whole would suffer 
no loss. However, as we saw above (Figure 4) most operators 
suffer below-average loss. In anyone year, a typical operator might 
be assessed a premium based on a 10 percent average industry 
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loss, but realize only a 5 percent return based on losses of that 
magnitude. The exceptional operator with a 20-percent loss, and 
who had paid premiums based on a lO-percent average expected 
loss, would realize a profit. 
Presumably these inequities would average out to some degree 
over a period of years as heavy losses moved by chance from 
operator to operator. And the variability of total losses may be 
less than that given in these hypothetical examples, and as seem 
to be true of predator losses (Figure 4). No total-loss raw data 
were available at the time this was written, and before any 
program was developed such data would need careful scrutiny. 
There are three possible ways of reducing the premium costs. 
One would be to establish a deductible clause which provided that 
no claims below a certain minimum would receive payment. This 
would affect a large number of operators if the total-loss distri-
bution is at all similar to the predator-loss pattern (Figure 4). 
A second means for reducing the premiums would be to ques-
tion the $20-per-head value assigned above. Some of the losses are 
among very young lambs. One may question whether a very small 
lamb should be appraised at the full market value of a large, fall 
lamb. Nielson and Curle (1970) have contended that a young 
lamb should receive such valuation, but it is perhaps an arguable 
point. 
A third means for reducing the premium cost would be a 
partial government subsidy. Premiums would be reduced to the 
degree that the cost was subsidized. 
All of this is speculative and needs careful study by actuarial 
experts in collaboration with industry spok!;)smen. But it would 
seem to have sufficient promise to bear thorough scrutiny. 
THE QUESTION OF SUBSIDIES 
The mention of partially subsidizing insurance premiums 
raises the entire question of subsidy. Many critics of predator 
control decry the practice because they are paying in part for 
something with their own tax dollars which they object to on prin-
ciple in the first place. In the next section, I will suggest that the 
public bears some moral obligations in this direction, but for 
the present let us consider the question of subsidy on purely eco-
nomic and social grounds. 
It is true that the industry is subsidized in several ways: The 
public funds used in predator control; the tariff on foreign wool 
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which maintains American wool products at higher prices than 
would exist if foreign products were allowed free competition; and a 
grazing fee charged to stockmen for the use of public lands which 
in the eyes of some critics is below the real value received for such 
grazing privileges. Some critics imply that such subsidies are 
somehow unethical, and that meat and wool products should 
somehow be left to unsupported competition. If the industry 
falters in the process, then this is simply the realities of life in a 
laissez-faire situation. 
This point is arguable on principle, but pragmatically it is a 
somewhat anachronistic view in an era when our economy is any-
thing but laissez-faire, and is perfused with an untold number and 
variety of subsidies. The point is especially well made by Evanson 
(1967:210-211) : 
The fact that sheepmen try to get as much subsidiza-
tion as possible to carry out control programs is a matter of 
political reality in a mixed economy wherein the 'gravy train' 
is a generally accepted mode of socio-economic conveyance. 
Criticism of sheep-raisers for their willingness to seek maxi-
mal public assistance must be tempered with recognition of 
the similar lobbying and pressure tactics of countless other 
interest groups, from the farmers and cattlemen who com-
pete with the sheepmen for land to the trade unions whose 
successes contribute to the rising costs of all labor inputs 
including herders, wranglers and shearers. The pressures 
exerted by woolgrowers for general predator control are 
assailable not on grounds of political immorality but on their 
economic and ecological unsoundness. 
To these points one may only add that any subsidy is, in 
principle, tacit acknowledgement of marginal economic viability. 
It is justified, not per se on the enhancement of profit margins for 
the institution to which it is directed. Rather, it is justified on (1) 
the benefits of continued survival of that institution and its goods 
and services to society; and (2) in a socially conscious society, 
the concern for preventing the institution's individuals from suf-
fering economic and social upheaval. Wool, lamb, and mutton are 
desirable products for our society. One may argue that foreign 
products could outcompete our own. But it seems desirable to 
perpetuate the capacity for producing them in this country against 
a future time when an expanded world population will make 
demands on all areas capable of producing food and fiber. 
The sheep industry has declined markedly in the past 30 
years. In the states discussed in the preceding pages, the number 
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of sheep grazed today is only one-third to one-half the number 
grazed in the 1930's or early 1940's when the industry reached 
its peak. This reduction has occurred because of increasing eco-
nomic squeeze, growing operational problems (e.g., difficulty of get-
ting competent herders), and particularly in those states with 
large amounts of public land, reduction in grazing quotas in the 
interest of range improvement. Like many of the criticisms of 
predator control, comments on range degradation caused by the 
sheep industry have almost reached cliche status. In the past, such 
degradation has certainly taken place, and some is still going on. 
But the general trend, at least on public lands, has gradually been 
reversed, and continued improvement can be expected in the years 
ahead. Management of public lands by the public agencies still 
undoubtedly has considerable room for advancement, but it is in-
creasingly competent and there has been a great deal of progress 
in the past 20 years. 
Whatever the causes, it is clear that the U.S. sheep industry 
opera tes on a narrow economic margin. Any increased cost would 
make more difficult an already strained situation. It is for this 
reason that subsidy has a role, if we grant that the industry is a 
desirable part of our society. 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
There is more to the rising public opposition to predator 
control than the ecological and economic issues. Indeed, there is a 
strong moral tone to that opposition, and for this reason the 
ethical aspects of the question bear scrutiny. It is quite possible 
that these aspects will carry more weight in the decisions that are 
ultimately made than the purely ecological and economic, although 
we shall see below that what may be ecologically wise and eco-
nomically beneficial to the stockman takes on ' the elements of a 
moral "ought." 
The last century and first half of this one constitute an era in 
which the pursuit of a high, material living standard was the 
socially approved, major preoccupation of the nation's citizenry. 
That living standard had to be extracted from the natural environ-
ment; and while the environment was richly endowed with re-
sources it often posed hardships which had to be overcome in order 
to reach the goal of material wealth. Hence, any resistance in 
the environment was viewed from a single-value, utilitarian perspec-
tive as an obstacle to be pushed aside. Except for a few voices 
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crying in the wilderness like Thoreau and Leopold, this utilitarian 
view of the world was seldom questioned. Predatory animals 
fell in this category. They were viewed largely as an impediment 
to profit-taking by the livestock industry, and hence, were a use-
less thing to be reduced if not extirpated. Although wildlife of all 
kinds in the United States have been considered a public resource 
since the beginning of the republic, few voices were raised against 
this destruction of public property by a minority of the populace. 
In recent years, the combined disenchantment with material 
values and realization that the quest for those values is depleting 
our resources and threatening irrevocable damage to our environ-
ment have led to serious questions, if not rejection, of the century 
and-a-half-old Amerian value system. These growing doubts have 
been paralleled by a rising romanticism; and by an awakening 
to, and growing love for, the nation's natural heritage. Paradoxi-
cally, the latter has been made possible by the mobility and leisure 
time afforded by our high standard of living. 
Within this growing romantic and naturalistic climate, all 
parts of nature are viewed with a new set of values. I t is the 
land as a whole which collectively built the riches and beauty 
of the continent, and predatory animals are inextricably a part of 
this total system which we call the land. One cannot cherish some 
parts and reject others, for the whole is only what it is with all of 
its parts. Leopold (1953) stated the view very well in his 
characteristically lyric prose: 
By land is meant all of the things on, over, or in the earth. 
Harmony with land is like harmony with a friend; you cannot 
cherish his right hand and chop off his left. That is to say, 
you cannot love game and hate predators; you cannot con-
serve the waters and waste the ranges; you cannot build the 
forest and mine the farm. The land is one organism. Its parts, 
like our own parts, compete with each other and cooperate 
with each other. The competitions are as much a part of the 
inner workings as the co-operations. You can regulate them 
-cautiously-but not abolish them. 
The outstanding scientific discovery of the twentieth 
century is not television, or radio, but rather the complexity 
of the land organism. Only those who know the most about 
it can appreciate how little we know about it. The last 
word in ignorance is the man who says of an animal or plant: 
'What good is it?' If the land mechanism as a whole is good, 
then every part is good, whether we understand it or not. If 
the biota, in the course of aeons, has built something we like 
but do not understand, then who but a fool would discard 
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seemingly useless parts? To keep every cog and wheel is the 
first precaution of intelligent tinkering. 
The American public, now awakened to its statutory ownership of 
the wildlife resource, and cherishing it from a broader, less utili-
tarian perspective, will no longer unquestioningly accept the re-
duction of that resource by any minority of the population. 
Yet, the public ownership of wild animals would seem to 
carry with it some element of responsibility, or even liability. 
Where one's possessions cause loss to those of another, the owner 
seemingly bears some obligation to the person affected. There are 
already a number of precedents for this principle in the case of 
wildlife. In many states, where deer, elk, beaver, or other wild 
animals cause damage to agricultural crops or other private prop-
erty, the state assumes responsibility either for compensation to 
the property owner for his loss, or for removal of the offending 
animals. 
This same principle would seem to apply in the case of preda-
tory animals killing livestock. The situation seems quite clear-cut 
in the case of livestock losses on private land. Losses on public 
land, where stockmen pay for seasonal grazing rights, pose a some-
what less clear-cut case, but may still fall within the principle. 
This right to redress for property damage is another justification 
for public subsidy of some form, as discussed above. Alternatives 
include predator control, compensation with public funds for 
losses, or partial subsidy of an insurance program. 
There is, however, more to the moral indignation over preda-
tor control than the loss of public property at the hands of a minor-
ity. There evidently is a widespread feeling that predator control, 
particularly those techniques which cause violent death, is morally 
wrong in some deep sense. Many of the persons holding this view 
undoubtedly do not stop to ask why it is wrong, but simply main-
tain the conviction on strong, unquestioned emotional grounds. 
It is fair to ask the authoritative basis for such convictions. 
We live, .. afterall, in an era when few moral premises have gone 
unchallenged, and when many have been rejected. And if such 
convictions are to be strong forces in policy decisions, it is reason-
able to enquire about their bases. 
There would seem to be only two answers to the philosophical 
question of what makes a certain act right or wrong. The first is 
Divine Edict which carries the teleological implication that the 
rightness or wrongness of an act is judged according to its place 
in some Grand Plan for existence. 
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We live, however, in an increasingly secular and humanistic 
age when even the traditional, institutionalized religions are mak-
ing concessions to "situation ethics." In this second, alternative 
answer to the question of rightness and wrongness, morality 
increasingly takes on a pragmatic role. Those acts which promote 
survival, happiness, and social order for the individuals in a society 
are deemed to be right or moral. Those acts which create unhappi-
ness, disorder, and threats to survival are deemed to be wrong. 
In this context, predator control seems implicitly to be deemed 
immoral on two counts. The first is on the count of humaneness, 
and killing animals in this way is implied to foster a callousness 
which may carryover 'into the way human beings relate to each 
other. Although the research and control divisions of the Bureau 
of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife have made progress in the direction 
of making coyote control species-specific and humane, no one 
including Division of Wildlife Services field agents, denies that the 
symptoms of 1080 poisoning are grim to behold in a dying coyote. 
Dobie (1950) has argued that engaging in such control activi-
ties tends to perpetuate a callous attitude toward animals de-
veloped during the frontier era in much of American society. Him-
self a seasoned outdoorsman, rancher, and horseman, Dobie advo-
cated the transition to a more "civilized perspective" which in-
cludes a feeling of sympathy and tolerance for animals other than 
our own species. The implication seems to be that we will become 
more tolerant, restrained, and civilized in our relations with our 
fellow man. 
The second count on which predator control is deemed im-
moral is the risk that it incurs for continued environmental health. 
Whether one accepts alarmist or conservative predictions of the 
effects of human activities on the environment, there seems little 
doubt that we cannot continue to exploit and despoil at our present 
rate without sooner or later imperiling our existence. As Leopold 
states in the passages cited above, we still do not have sufficient 
understanding of the complexities of the ecosystem. Hence, it 
seems desirable to perturb that system as little as possible in order 
to minimize the risks of unforeseen, irrevocable change (Wagner, 
1969). If we can derive our needs and comforts without a given 
perturbation, such would seem to be desirable. The information 
in Table 2 suggests that we might be able to forego some aspects 
of widespread intensive predator control, e.g., use of toxic agents. 
Leopold (1933a, 1947) suggested that such restraint would 
not be attained until we develop a new ethic in which we extend 
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the same ethical precepts to the land that we now extend to 
other human beings: 
A thing is right only when it tends to preserve the integrity, 
stability, and beauty of the community, and the community 
includes the soil, waters, fauna, and flora as well as people. 
WHAT COURSE OF ACTION? 
We now come to the point of decision between several courses 
of action. We have weighed the available evidence and considered 
a number of aspects of the problem. To the scientist, the evidence 
leaves much to be desired for much of it does not come from care-
fully planned and executed research, and that which does may well 
be fraught with biases of unknown form and magnitude. Yet, with 
all its uncertainties, the available evidence would seem to be a 
better basis on which to make decisions than the many impres-
sions, emotionally loaded biases, and misconceptions which abound 
on this subject. 
In review, the eviaence we have examined suggests the follow-
ing : (1) Coyote control does reduce coyote numbers to some de-
gree in some areas. (2) This reduction in coyote numbers does not 
appear to reduce total sheep losses materially, and by implication 
increases in coyote numbers might not be the economic coup de 
grace that sheepmen fear. (3) Control efforts do not have the 
marked side effects on the ecosystem which its opponents claim. 
These conclusions are drawn for predator control as currently 
practiced in most states, largely by the Division of Wildlife Serv-
ices. Greatly intensified effort, either by the existing control 
groups, or by large numbers of private individuals might well 
produce a very different picture. 
What, then, are the alternate decisions? One can consider first 
the extremes: Intensification of control, or total abandonment. 
If given their choice, most sheepmen would probably opt for inten-
sified control. But in view of the public pressures now being 
brought to bear, this alternative seems out of the question. More-
over, it cannot be advocated seriously on ecological, economic, 
or ethical grounds. Indeed, it does not seem that the status quo 
can, or should, be maintained. 
What of total abandonment? We have suggested above that 
the stockman has some right to protection from offending animals. 
Few critics of predator control go so far as to deny this. One can 
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suggest a loss payment or insurance program as an alternative to 
control, but there are uncertainties about the workability of the 
insurance idea. And, utilitarian view or not, it seems unnecessarily 
wasteful to stand by and let a coyote kill large numbers of lambs 
out of a flock and not do something about it. 
There is also reason to fear that stockmen would take control 
into their own hands if no control organziation were available. In 
this event, society would loose control over, and record of, what 
is taking place. The risk of dire effects would then increase sub-
stantially. 
Whatever the eventual decision, it seems important to bar t he 
private operator from systematic control except, perhaps, in emer-
gency situations. This can be accomplished best by effective, 
well-enforced state laws. In the past, state departments of natural 
resources have been primarily concerned with game species. But 
as public awareness and appreciation of nature have broadened, 
these agencies are more and more recognizing a responsibility for 
the protection and husbandry of all wild animal species. Predators 
have increasingly received this recognition. Mountain lions have 
been placed on the game animal list in Utah, and timber wolves 
have been afforded complete protection in states where they are 
nearing extinction. 
The more common predators, like coyotes, could be similarly 
protected by state laws which made sport hunting and fur trapping 
legal under license, season, and bag provisions. And such laws 
could provide for control activities by authorized, government em-
ployees, either state or federal. The Cain Report recommended 
additional deterrents to private control. One was a ban on shoot-
ing from planes by unauthorized persons. And it recommended 
revocation of public grazing permits for individuals who engaged 
in illegal predator control on public lands. 
If the extremes among the alternative courses of action seem 
to have shortcomings, what of the other alternatives? Nothing 
would convince stockmen more effectively that abandonment of 
generalized coyote population reduction, especially the use of toxic 
agents, does not result in prohibitively increased stock losses than 
to see it demonstrated on a limited basis. The same can be said 
of the success of an insurance venture. If stockmen in three or 
four western states would volunteer to accept a 5-year experi-
mental abandonment of poisons and seriously try the insurance 
idea, they could assume a leadership role and remove some of the 
public ill will that has built up against them in recent years. If as 
successful as anticipated, this plan could ease the transition to 
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complete abandonment of toxicants at the end of 5 years. It 
should be accompanied by careful evaluation through well-designed 
research, and the enactment of state laws described above. 
Although the evidence we have reviewed suggests that sheep 
losses viewed as a state-wide or region-wide statistical phenomenon 
may be less than stockmen commonly believe, there is no question 
that some ranchers experience heavy, concentrated losses. The 
number of such losses could conceivably increase with relaxation 
of control. If we have any sense of social concern, we will not 
deny that these individuals deserve some measure of protection 
from such losses. Hence, it seems desirable to retain some mecha-
nism that can carry out a trouble-shooting type of control. That 
effort can best be provided by some governmental organization, 
either state or federal, with a trained group of control agents. 
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